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Legal Positivism and the Natural Law: The
Controversy Between Professor Hart and
Professor Fuller
George Breckenridge
Mister Breckenridge discusses the similarities and differences and

reasons for the differences between the views of Professors Hart and
Fuller on legal positivism and natural law. Since the argument of each

professor depends ultimately on his definition of law and his view of the
meaning of morality in relation to the nature of man and the world
in which man lives, the author concludes that their philosophical differ-

ences appearirreconcilable.

I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Hart defends legal positivism and Professor Fuller sets
out his view of the natural law. Perhaps it would be more accurate
to say that Fuller is against positivism and Hart against natural law.
Each is an untypical representative of the varied traditions that bear
these names. Each is, at the same time, because of his radical restatement and defense of his positions, probably the most reasonable and
least extreme antagonist. In this dialogue, if anywhere, we are likely
to discover the true issues and the common ground, if any, between
the two positions. In fact each concedes, frankly or by implication,
several cardinal points of criticism raised by the other, but holds the
points conceded to be of little importance or of little relevance to
the fundamental issue as he sees it. Hart concedes much from the
traditional position of legal positivism, but holds that this does not
affect his main argument. Fuller makes no attempt to defend the
traditional natural law positions, popularly associated with a higher
law, or a "brooding omnipresence in the skies," and is most careful to
establish his position on its own credentials. Ultimately, I shall
suggest that the only real issues at stake between Hart and Fuller
are the criteria of relevance and importance. The case each makes
and the cogency of his case against the other depends ultimately on
his definition of law and his view of the meaning of morality, so that,
in the last analysis, the argument comes down, as all good philosophical arguments are supposed to, to the view of the nature of man
and the universe in which he lives.
The form of the argument will follow, in the main, that of Professor
Harts article, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" in
945
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the HarvardLaw Review in 1958.1 In that article Hart raises systematically and frankly what I take to be the principal points of controversy between legal positivists and natural lawyers (as distinct
from those controversies among natural lawyers as to the meaning
and content of the natural law). Hart's position will be expanded
and illustrated, where appropriate, from the argument of his book,
The Concept of Law, published three years later.2 What, in effect,
Professor Fuller does in reply, though not so systematically, is to take
Harts discussion of each of the points and use it to support his own
formulation of the natural law position. Again, Fuller's argument in
the Harvard Law Review article,3 "Positivism and Fidelity to LawA Reply to Professor Hart," is supplemented by his book, The Morality
of Law, published in 1964.4
This paper will attempt to understand and set out separately the
positions of Professors Hart and Fuller before attempting in the
fourth section to evaluate the similarities and differences between
them and the reasons for the differences which appear to be irreconcilable.
II. HAIRT'S

POSITION IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL

PosvI sM

The principle that Hart undertakes to defend and reassert is the
familiar "separation of law and morality"; this in the interest of both
"intellectual clarity and moral integrity," and in the fact of "contemporary voices [that] tell us . . . that there is a 'point of intersection
between law and morals' or that what is and what ought to be are
somehow indissolubly fused or inseparable." 5 Hart takes legal positivism "to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary
truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality,
though in fact they have often done so."6
The founders of the modem school of legal positivists were the
Utilitarians, in particular Benthem and Austin, and Hart lines himself
up with "the concern of the great battle-cries of legal positivism."7
He quotes Austin: "The existence of law is one thing; its merits or
demerits is another." Gray: "The Law of a State ... is not an ideal,
1.
2.
3.
REV.

71 IIv.

L. REV. 593 (1958).

HAIT, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).

Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAnv. L.
630 (1958).

4. FULLm, THE MoairAL
OF LAw (1964). The book is an expansion of the Storrs
Lectures on Jurisprudence at Yale University.
5. Quoting D'ENTREvEs, ThE NATuBAL LAw 116 (2d ed. 1955) and FULLER, ThE
LAw n~rQUEST OF ITSELF 12 (1940), respectively.
6. HART, op. cit. supra note 2, at 181-82.
7. Id. at 203.
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but something which actually exists... it is not that which it ought
to be, but that which is."; and Kelsen: "Legal norms may have any
kind of content."8 (As is suggested by the quotation, and as we shall
discuss later, Kelsen's position is a significant departure from the
Utilitarian position.)
Hart, first of all, wishes to make quite clear what doctrines concerning law the Utilitarians did in fact hold and to dismiss the positivist
"straw men" bandied about in the Anglo-American literature on the
subject.
He dismisses as indefensible and probably undefended the extreme
formalist contention "that a legal system is a 'closed logical system'
in which correct decisions can be deduced from pre-determined legal
rules by logical means alone." 9
He sets aside as likewise alien to the position of Bentham and
Austin, though it was held by Kelsen, the fact-value dichotomy, the
contention "that moral judgments cannot be established, as statements
of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof."10 Hart considers this controversy to be essentially irrelevant to the main issue.
Proof that the principles by which we evaluate or condemn laws are rationally

discoverable ...leaves untouched the fact that there are laws which may
have any degree of iniquity or stupidity and still be laws. And conversely

there are rules that have every moral qualification to be laws and yet are
not laws."
Hart is also most willing to concede the "facts" of the influence of
moral ideas upon law-making and even "that the stability of legal
systems depends in part upon such types of correspondence with
morals." Again, he feels it obvious that such a connection does not at
all affect the necessary distinction between law and morality.
Having cleared the ground in this manner, Hart is left with three
basic doctrines of legal positivism as held by Bentham and Austin.
First, that there is no necessary connection between law and morals,
or law as it is and law as it ought to be; second, that laws are commands of human beings; and third, "that the analysis or study of
meanings of legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished
from (though in no way hostile to) historical inquiries, sociological
inquiries, and the critical appraisal of law in terms of morals, social
aims, functions, etc."' 2 Harts cardinal aim is to uphold the first of
8. Quoting AusnN, TnE PRovIxcE OF JuRISPRuDENcE DETm uvEI 184-85 (Library
of Ideas ed. 1954); GnY, THE NATRE AND SouRcES OF ms LAW 213 (1909); KELsEN,
GENERAL THEoRY OF LAw AN STATE 113 (1949).

9. HART, op.cit. supra note 2, at 181.

10. Id. at 253.
11. Hart, supra note 1, at 626.
12. HART, op. cit. supra note 2, at 253.
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these principles and, in order to do so he deals with four main lines
of attack on the positivist position. These attacks are on the other
two principles mentioned above and two further ones, namely, the
argument from the experience of the Nazi government in Germany, and
the argument which considers a legal system as a whole rather than
particular laws.
In each case, Hart concedes considerable validity in the criticisms
but, he denies that any of these concessions in any significant sense
represents an "intersection" of law and morals which would affect
his central thesis.
The first line of criticism Hart deals with is that centering on the
imperative or command theory of law. The most concise statement
is probably that of Austin, that law is the command of a superior
habitually obeyed. Hart demonstrates "the inadequacy of orders
backed by threats and habits of obedience for the understanding of
13
the foundations of a legal system and the idea of legal validity."
Briefly, his argument contains the following points: Legal order
cannot simply be identified with compulsion. While it is possible to
think of the criminal law in terms of "obedience," "disobedience" and
"sanction," "other legal rules are presented to society in quite different
ways and have quite different functions." 14 Efforts to reduce all laws
to terms of "sanction" are absurd. "One might as well urge that the
rules of baseball were 'really' only complex conditional directions to
the scorer and that this showed their real or 'essential' nature."15
Likewise, Salmond's criticism of the command theory is valid, that
it is impossible to derive individual rights and powers from a command.' 6 Furthermore, a legislature of changing composition cannot
be considered a "sovereign habitually obeyed" and, most importantly,
"nothing which legislators do makes law unless they comply with
fundamental accepted rules specifying the essential lawmaking procedures." 17 Thus, law itself is ultimately based on public acceptance,
just as "a necessary condition of the existence of coercive power is
that some at least must voluntarily cooperate in the system and
accept its rules."' 8
The key to the foundation of law and the inadequacies of the
Utilitarian scheme clearly lies in the "fundamentally accepted rules"
and "an analysis of what it is for a social group and its officials to
accept such rules .... [I]t is apparent that the social acceptance of
a rule or standard of authority ... must be brought into the analysis
13. Id. at 198.
14. Hart, supra note 1, at 604.
15. Id. at 605.
16. SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE

17. Hart, supra note 1, at 603.
18. HART, op. cit. supra note 2, at 603.

97-98 (1893).
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and cannot itself be reduced to the two simple terms" [command
and habit], yet there is no necessary connection here with morality.
. . . "Rules that confer rights, though distinct from commands, need

not be moral rules or coincide with them."19
In the Concept of Law, Hart develops as the foundation of the legal
order a system of primary and secondary rules; primary rules of obligation, imposing duties; and secondary rules, conferring powers, in
particular, rules of recognition, adjudication and change. "[M]ost of
the features of law which have proved most perplexing and have both
provoked and eluded the search for definition can best be rendered
clear, if these two types of rules and the interplay between them are
understood."20 Thus, the system of accepted rules replace crude command as the basis of law.
The second line of attack on the positivist position grew out of the
study of the actual judicial process undertaken by the American
"realist" school of jurisprudence. Judicial interpretation is necessarily
involved in bringing particular cases under general rules. Thus, "the
open texture of law leaves a vast field for a creative activity which
some call legislative."21 What has been called a "penumbra" of uncertainty necessarily surrounds the use of all legal rules "and it
follows," so runs the criticism, "that if legal arguments and legal
decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, [and that is the
agreed assumption] their rationality must lie in something other than
a logical relation to its premises." 22 Thus, there must be some standard
other than deductive reasoning to guide the process of interpretation,
and "it seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision
sound in such cases is some concept of what law ought to be."23
This much of the critics' position Hart in effect concedes. A formalist
or literalist view of legal interpretation is, however, not an essential part of the positivist position, nor does the demonstration
of the error have any implication at all for the distinction between
law and morals. Automatic decisions may be bad law but they are
law. "It does not follow that, because the opposite of a decision
reached blindly in the formalist or literalist manner is a decision
intelligently reached by reference to some conception of what ought
to be, we have a junction of law and morals ....
The word 'ought'
merely reflects the presence of some standard of criticism ...

all standards are moral."2
19. Hart, supra note 1, at 606.
20. IInT, op. cit. supranote 2, at 79.
21. Id. at 200.
22. Hart supra note 1, at 608.
23. ibid.
24. Id. at 612-13.

but not
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In any case, there is no need to inject moral considerations into the
discussion. "[Elverything we have learned about the judicial process
can be expressed in other less mysterious ways. We can say laws are
incurably incomplete and we must decide the penumbral cases rationally by reference to social aims."25 The critics, on the other hand,
tend to widen the conception of "law" to include within it the sense
of purpose which will encompass all cases of the rule's application
and to suggest that "the judges are only 'drawing out' of the rule
what, if it is properly understood, is 'latent' within it."26 Hart coneludes that:
to soften the distinction [between clear and penumbral cases], to assert
mysteriously that there is some fused identity between law as it is and
as it ought to be, is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no central element
of actual law to be seen in the core of central meaning which rules
have .... 27

There is, however, an aspect of the judicial process in which Hart
holds "morality" to be important, and that is in the administering of

the law. He describes the "judicial virtues" as: "impartiality and
neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the interest
of all who will be affected; and a concern to deploy
some acceptable
'
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision."
The third type of criticism of the separation of law and morals is
drawn from the German experience under the Nazi regime. "It ...
is less an intellectual argument.., than a passionate appeal supported
not by detailed reasoning but by reminders of a terrible experience."2
Here the question is not so much one of intellectual clarity as of the
usefulness of different philosophies of law as a guide to practical
conduct in the face of immoral state action. The challenge to Hart's
position would seem to be particularly strong in view of the conversion to a natural law position of Gustav Radbruch, a prominent
German legal philosopher who, like most of his contemporaries, had
espoused the positivist position in the 1930's. Particularly serious was
the charge by some, including Radbruch, that the very dominance of
the positivist philosophy in Germany had at least seriously inhibited
any reaction against the Nazi perversion of legal forms.
The argument centers around the dilemma of the German courts
after the war when faced with the Nazi "informer" cases. 3 We need
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 615.
HAnT, op. cit. supranote 2, at 200.
Hart, supranote 1, at 615.
See discussion in Hart, supra note 1, at 618-20; Fuller, supra note 3, at
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not go into the details, but the essence of the disagreement is whether
an admittedly immoral "law" is in fact a "law" and thus, due the
consideration of obedience. Hart cites Austin as being "emphatic in
condemning those who said that if human laws conflicted with the
fundamental principles of morality then they cease to be laws, as
talking 'stark nonsense."' 3' This emphatic rejection of natural law,
however, "went along... with the conviction that if laws reached a
certain degree of iniquity then there would be a plain moral obligation
32
to resist them and to withhold obedience."

Hart sees the positivist statement of the citizen's dilemma in the
face of an immoral "law" as being much more realistic and straightforward than that of the critics. Instead of being faced with the
decision as to whether a law was sufficiently immoral to no longer
deserve the title and respect of law, the citizen is faced, as in so many
areas of life, with a choice, a choice between the obligation to obey
the law of the land and the obligation to act morally. Both of these
obligations Hart assumes to exist.
Hart thus is concerned to vindicate the implications of the positivist
position and "to show that, in spite of all that has been learned and
experienced since the Utilitarians wrote, and in spite of the defects of
other parts of their doctrine, their protest against the confusion of
what is and what ought to be law has a moral as well as an intellectual
value."3
In the fourth part of his argument, Hart deals with the question
whether a legal system taken as a whole, rather than a particular
law, has any "necessary properties." Here again Hart concedes much.
He concedes,
that no system which utterly failed in this respect [to measure up to some

moral or other standard] has ever existed or could endure; that the normally

fulfilled assumption that a legal system aims at some form of justice colours

the whole way in which we interpret specific rules in particular cases, and

if this normally fulfilled assumption were not fulfilled no one would have
any reason to obey except fear . . . and still less, of course, any moral
34
obligation to obey.

Hart wishes, however, to make two further important points in this
regard, one substantive and the other procedural.
First, certain basic rules such as those forbidding the free use of
648-57. For a most intriguing use of these cases to illustrate the practical problems
of jurisprudence, see FuLrLa, The Problem of the Grudge Informer, in TnE MoRAI=n-y
OF THE LAW (App. 1964).
31. Hart, supranote 1, at 616.
32. Id. at 616-17.
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id. at 622.
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violence and constituting a minimum form of property (possession of
food) are dictated by man's present physical circumstances.
At present, and until .. .radical changes supervene, such rules are so
fundamental that if a legal system did not have them there would be no
point in having any other rules at all. Such rules overlap with basic moral
principles vetoing murder, violence, and theft; and so we can add to the

factual statement that all legal systems in fact coincide with morality at
is, in this sense, necessarily so.
such vital points, the statement that 3this
5
And why not call it a natural necessity?

Even this much is dependent upon the existence of the minimum aim
"of survival in close proximity to our fellows." "[I]t seems to me,"
writes Hart, "that above this minimum the purposes men have for
living in society are too conflicting and varying to make possible much
extension of the argument that some fuller overlap of legal rules and
moral standards is 'necessary' in this sense." 35 According to Hart, the
trouble with natural law theory, "in all its protean disguises," is that
it attempts to push this whole argument much farther into areas
where there is in fact no widespread agreement.
Next, the purpose of legal rules demands that they have a certain
form. "If social control . . . is to function, the rules must satisfy
certain conditions: they must be intelligible and within the capacity
of most to obey, and in general they must not be retrospective, though
exceptionally they may be."37 There are also the "judicial virtues,"
previously mentioned, of objectivity and impartiality in the administration of the law and the demand that like cases be treated alike.
However, "this is justice in the administration of the law, and not
justice of the law.m [A] legal system that satisfied these minimum
requirements might apply... [impartially] laws which were hideously
oppressive ... ."39 Thus, the existence of a minimum morality in the
legal system does not at all vitiate his central distinction of the
separation of law and morality. Apropos of Fuller's "inner morality
of law," Hart writes: "If this is what the necessary connection of law
and morality means, we may accept it. It is unfortunately compatible
with very great iniquity."4
III. Fu xiL's POSMON AGAINST LEGAL PosuivlsM
Fuller's article is written in reply to that of Hart. Since, as I have
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 623.
Ibid.
HAnT,op. cit. supra note 2, at 202.
Hart, supra note 1, at 624.
Ibid.
Id. at 602.
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endeavored to demonstrate, Hart clears away much of the debris
from the argument and sheds much of the doctrinal rigidity from
the Utilitarian position, Fuller is able to concentrate his attack on the
four main points in Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality, which Hart sees as the true essence of legal positivism. Three
of these points are points of philosophical principle, while the fourth,
concerning the Nazi regime, is essentially practical.
One of the problems in a discussion of the moral utility4l of the
positivist or natural law positions is that in almost all cases in our
experience in the Western democracies there has, fortunately, been no
very obvious conflict between law and the demands of morality.
Indeed, most of the claims of conflict, usually couched in natural-law
terms, have been so dubious as to have tended to discredit the natural
law argument. Thus, the cutting edge of the problem has had to be
most often examined in hypothetical examples. The clearest exception
to this has of course been Nazi Germany.42
What Fuller attempts to do in effect is to demonstrate a necessary
relation between law and morals at the points at which Hart recognized the possibility of a nexus, but either denied a necessary relation
or disparaged its importance for the purposes of the basic distinction
he proposed.
First, as regards the foundation of the legal system, Fuller considers
that Hart cannot so lightly abandon the command theory of law
without damaging his central distinction. Both flow from what he
considers a larger error:
[Austin] teeters on the edge of an abandonment of the command theory
in favor of what Professor Hart has described as a view that discerns the
foundations of a legal order in "certain fundamental accepted rules specifying

the essential law-making procedures." . . . [Yet] [h]e does not take it

because he bad a sure insight that it would forfeit the black-and-white,

distinction between law and morality that was the whole object of his
43
Lectures ....

The basic problem is that, in a philosophy that insists on setting
apart 'law as it is," law must be conceived entirely in terms of its
formal source. Otherwise, "how are we to distinguish between those
basic rules that owe their validity to acceptance, and those which
are properly rules of law, valid even when men generally consider
41. In the sense of being conducive to the support of moral conduct.
42. The example of Nazi Germany has, of course, been used to castigate both
sides, as demonstrating, on the one hand, the weakness of positivism effectively to
criticize such practices, and, on the other, the ineffectiveness in practice of those who
profess a belief in natural law.
43. Fuller, supra note 3, at 640.
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them to be evil or il-advised?" 44 Thus, a positivist view of law must
have an anchor, such as a sovereign who commands.
Kelsen rejected the command theory as untenable, but was faced
with the same problem.
Kelsen realizes that before we can distinguish between what is law and
what is not, there must be an acceptance of some basic procedure by
which law is made. In any legal system there must be some fundamental
rule that points unambiguously to the source from which the laws must
come in order to be laws. This rule Kelsen called the "basic norm." 45

However, "the notion of the basic norm is admittedly a symbol, not a

fact. It is a symbol that embodies the positivist quest for some clear
and unambiguous test of law ...

."4

The basic norm is "a fiction which

simplifies reality into a form which can be absorbed by positivism." 47
In Fuller's view, it is impossible "to treat law simply as a manifested
fact of social power . . . except through a falsification of the reality

on which it purports to build."48 Law cannot be purely the product
of a procedure but must, in some sense be substantive, for any
formal law-giving authority is possible only because of accepted
rules which are more fundamental, and because of a fundamental
acceptance or "moral attitudes that accord . . . to it [authority] the

competency it claims." 49 Rules "are accepted and followed because
they are seen to be right or necessary or both."" Hart even quotes
Kelsen as in effect supporting this view that there must be a minimum
"natural law" without which positive law is impossible. The basic
norm is not valid because it has been created in a certain way, but
its validity is assumed by virtue of its content. It is valid, then, like
a norm of natural law... .-51
Harts primary and secondary rules are no solution to the problem,
since they are an attempt to locate the formal source of law. The
difficulties which, in Fuller's opinion, this attempt encounters, particularly in the matter of the persistence of law when "sovereigns" change
or temporarily do not exist, arises from the basic positivist error of
method. Hart is attempting to set up general juristic principles to
determine questions of sociological fact, the location of the formal
law-making authority, rather than basing law ultimately in some
concept of a natural law.
44. Id. at 641.
45. Ibid.
46.
47.
48.
49.
_.50.

Ibid.
Ibid.
FuLttm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 147.
Fuller, supra note 3, at 645.
Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J.

(1954).

51. Id. at 461 n.2, quoting KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 401.
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Fuller also attacks another point which he considers vital. 'Hart
admits the central importance of the obligation of fidelity to law.
However, a theory of law which is based on a formal source cannot
possibly explain the existence of this obligation. The obligation in
Hart's theory can only be taken as given.
On the question of the judicial interpretation of laws, Fuller first
attacks Harts division of the meaning of legal rules into a "core
of central meaning" and a "penumbra" and for thus implying that
the application of a law to particular cases is, in most cases, quite
clear and only occasionally calls for a wider consideration of the
purpose of the law in question. By the use of a piece of linguistic
analysis (to which both of them resort in this matter of interpretation),
Fuller endeavors to demonstrate that it is never really possible to interpret even a single word in a particular statute without knowing
the aim of the statute. He suggests that given only the phrase "all
improvements must be promptly reported to . . ." it is in fact
impossible to assign any clear meaning to the word "improvement,"
for example.5 2 Thus "we must.., be sufficiently capable of putting
ourselves in the position of those who drafted the rule to know what
they thought 'ought to be.' It is in the light of this 'ought' that we
must decide what the rule 'is.' 53 The difference between Fuller and
Hart on this point is more than a matter of degree, as might appear,
in the light of Fullers fundamental concept of law as purposeful
human activity.
Hart had also accepted that "the open texture of law leaves a
vast field for a creative activity" ' 4 and that a judge must sometimes
interpret law in the light of his concept of what it "ought to be."
Far from accepting this as favoring some concept of natural law in the
general approach to interpretation, Hart points out that "ought"
merely implies the existence of a standard and that the "morality"
brought to interpretation could be "immoral." This touches one of
the most fundamental parts of Fuller's position. "Hart seems to
assume that evil aims may have as much coherence and inner logic
as good ones. I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption."55 Given
the virtues of rationality, coherence, and generality-which are at
least implicit in Hart's conception of a working legal system-and the
judicial virtues he accepts as an essential part of such a system, it
is impossible for Fuller to conceive of a legal system being operated
systematically and smoothly towards an immoral end.
52. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HA.v. L.
REv. 630, 644-45 (1958).
53. Id. at 666.
54. HART,TBE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (1961).

55. Fuller, supranote 52, at 636.
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This reveals an underlying and radical difference in the conceptions
of morality held by the two men which will be discussed more fully
below, but meantime Fuller's last point is obviously crucial for his
discussion of the Nazi experience.
For Fuller, Hart's formulation of the citizen's dilemma in Nazi
Germany, between the obligation to obey the law and the obligation
to act morally, makes no sense. Throughout his discussion, Hart seems
to assume that the only difference between Nazi law and, say, English
law is that the Nazis used their laws to achieve ends that are odious
to an Englishman. This assumption is, I think, seriously mistaken
....

51 While it is true that "more than any other in history, the

Nazi dictatorship came to power through the calculated exploitation
of legal forms,"57 Fuller cites the Nazi use of retroactive curative
laws to cover official action, the use of secret laws and unpublished
instructions to those administering the laws, and the use of mob
violence and disregard of even their own statutes, to demonstrate that
there did not exist latterly in Germany anything that, by any conceivable criterion, could be called a legal order. By the use of such
procedures, the Nazis totally undermined what Fuller calls "the inner
morality of the law." In such circumstances, the obligation of fidelity
to law on the part of the citizen is not merely outweighed by his
obligation to act morally, it has been totally dissolved.
In Fuller's opinion,
a positivistic philosophy . . . never gives any coherent meaning to the

moral obligation of fidelity to law. This obligation seems to be conceived as
sui generis, wholly unrelated to any of the ordinary, extralegal ends of
human life. The fundamental postulate of positivism-that law must be
strictly severed from morality-seems to deny the possibility of any bridge
between the obligation to obey law and other moral obligations. No mediating principle can measure their respective demands on conscience, for they
exist in wholly separate worlds. 58

The crux of the disagreement between Fuller and Hart on the
fourth point, concerning the necessary content of law, lies in Hart's
statement that the "inner morality of law" is "unfortunately compatible
with very great iniquity."59
The central part of Fuller's development of a natural law position
lies in this concept of the "inner morality of law," which he develops
at length in The Morality of Law. A legal system has an inherent logic
that must be respected if the purpose of a legal system is to be
56. Id. at 650.
57. Fuller, supra note 50, at 465.
58. HAIT, op. cit. supra note 54, at 200.
59. Id. at 202.
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achieved. The demands of this internal morality are classified and
discussed by Fuller under the following heads: The generality of
law (laws must consist of general rules); promulgation (citizens must
know what is expected before they can obey); retroactive laws (a
system which is made up solely or largely of retroactive laws could
not function); clarity in the law (necessary for obedience); contradictions in the law (these produce chaos); laws cannot require the
impossible; laws must maintain some degree of constancy through
time; and there must be some congruence between official action and
the declared rule if chaos is to be avoided. These are the "natural"
elements of law in the sense in which one may speak of the "natural
laws of carpentry." They form a procedural natural law distinct
from a "substantive" natural law or the "external morality of law."
Now Hart concedes much of this, although he does not seem to
attach much significance to it. For his case against Hart to stick
on this point, therefore, Fuller must obviously establish an intimate
connection between the internal and external moralities of law.
Fuller's argument is based, first of all, on the connection between
order and good order, or between law and good law. He argues that
"the internal morality of the law is not something added to, or imposed
on, the power of law, but is an essential condition of that power
itself. If this conclusion is accepted, then the first observation... is
that law is a precondition of good law,"60
The principles of the inner morality are principles of morality and
it is clear that "a proper respect for the internal morality of law
limits the kind of substantive aims that may be achieved through
legal rules." 6 ' Fuller answers Hart's casual dismissal of the inner
morality of law as being "compatible with great iniquity" by asking,
rather impatiently one imagines, "Does Hart mean merely that it is
possible, by stretching the imagination, to conceive the case of an
evil monarch who pursues the most iniquitous ends but at all times
preserves a genuine respect for the principles of legality [i.e. legal
morality] ?"62
Before going any farther, it is necessary to consider Fullers basic
conception of what law is. Fuller takes a "process" view of law. Law
is a purposive human undertaking. A legal system is "the product of
sustained purposive effort," but it is the product of human effort and
thus, its attainment is always a matter of degree. The purpose of
law as an institution is "that of subjecting human conduct to the
guidance and control of general rules."63 This "modest indulgence in
60. FULm,
61. Id. at 4.
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teleology," therefore, provides us with a standard for judging the
degree of legality of a legal system. There are also, in Fuller's view,
important implications for substantive morality, implicit in this concept of the law and in the principles of the inner morality of the law.
[Liegal morality can be said to be neutral over a wide range of ethical
issues [law may be bad law]. It cannot be neutral in its view of man
himself. To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that
man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and
following rules and answerable for his defaults.
Every departure from the principles of the law's inner morality is an affront
to man's dignity as a responsible agent.64

Fuller continues:
I have attempted to show that the internal morality of law does indeed
deserve to be called a 'morality.' . . . [A]n acceptance of this morality is a
necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the realization of justice .
this morality is itself violated when an attempt is made to express blind
hatreds through legal rules, and ... the specific morality of law articulates
and holds before us a view of man's nature that is indispensible to law
and morality alike. 65

Fuller also disagrees with Harts "minimum content of natural law"
as dictated by man's desire to survive. Hart "seems to be saying that
it [survival] furnishes the core and central element of all human
striving. This, I think, cannot be accepted. As Thomas Aquinas
remarked long ago, if the highest aim of a captain were to preserve
his ship, he would keep it in port forever.66 Fuller would not add
more specific content to Hart's minimum, but rather a sense of
direction.
III. SPEc Fic PoNTs o

DiFFEEENCE

Before we turn to the specific points of difference between Hart and
Fuller, it may be useful to sketch in some of the philosophical
background, as I see it, in order better to emphasize the divergent
positions each is really concerned to establish.
Hart places himself in the Utilitarian tradition. The Utilitarian
philosophers, particularly Bentham, were first of all legal reformers,
motivated by strong liberal convictions and moral indignation. They
rejected the existing archaic and iniquitous legal system and, at the
same time, the philosophical traditions by which it was presumably
64. Id. at 162.
65. Id. at 168.
66. Id. at 185.
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supported, whether the absolute, self-evident principles in the name
of which much injustice would in fact be condoned, or the older
natural-law tradition based on Christian morality and the teleological
view of the world. The Utilitarians were, therefore concerned
with building a legal structure without such a base. They wished
to separate law from fuzzy and reactionary moral ideas and to establish jurisprudence as the science concerned with what the law is, in
order to preserve the integrity, as they saw it, of the concept of law
as the basis of social order, and to bring about reform of the existing
legal system on the basis of social utility. Law for the legal positivists
was defined as the command of the sovereign, one or many. The inadequacy of the command theory of law (dealt with at length by
Hart) was the first element of the positivist system to cause trouble.
Kelsen, in effect, substitutes for it the "basic norm" as the positive
source of law, an arbitrarily defined rock on which the legal system
can be built, though, as Fuller points out, the basic norm is a convenient legal fiction rather than an identifiable entity.
Hart is, I think, motivated by much the same attitudes as !he
early Utilitarians. He is concerned with maintaining a clear distinction
between what the law actually is and the various ideas of wliat it
ought or ought not to be. For him the positivist approach is that dictated by common sense and clear thinking and it is also a necessary preliminary for any attempt to judge the law. In contrast, the general
approach of the natural law is confusing, multivariate and based on
assumptions "unacceptable to the modern mind." Hart concedes a
great deal of the Utilitarian position and agrees that there are necessary aspects of the legal system in which it might be said that moral
elements were contained in the law, but he denies that these affect
his basic distinction.
In the face of the positivist claim that one can maintain a legal
system separated from morality, Fuller seeks to demonstrate, by using
the points raised by Hart, that it simply cannot be done. Fuller defines
natural law, in sharp contradistinction to legal positivism, as "the view
which denies the possibility of a rigid separation of the is and the
ought, and which tolerates a confusion of them in legal discussion."6 7
The course of the argument between Hart and Fuller depends on
three vital "points of contact" between "law" and "morality." Fuller
maintains that at these three points, three basic aspects of the
phenomenon of law are so inseparable from morality, that it is impossible to maintain that law as a whole can be clearly distinguished
from morality. Hart, at least in two of the cases, does not deny the
"contact" between an aspect of law and an idea of morality, but in
67.
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each case he does deny that the significance of this is such as to
vitiate his general distinction between law and morality. The three
points concern the foundations of the legal order; the minimum necessary content of the law; and what Fuller calls the inner morality
of law.
First, concerning the foundations of the legal order, Fuller maintains
that law is ultimately dependent on something which is not law.
A law and a law-making body are essentially substantive moral concepts since they are entirely dependent for their existence and proper
functioning upon acceptance and the general obligation to be faithful
to the law. Thus, law and obligation are ultimately of the same
substance. In contrast to this, Hart wishes to base the legal order
upon a system of primary and secondary rules, obligation stemming
from the primary rules and law-making authority from the secondary
rules. These Hart maintains are merely neutral, since the rules are
procedural rather than substantive; however, this really does not
remove Fuller's objection but merely sets it back a stage. More
fundamental than any rule must be the acceptance of the rule, and it
is difficult to see how the idea of acceptance can be entirely divorced
from substantive moral content. Thus, the statement, "Parliament
makes laws," can never be purely a statement of procedure.
Second, it is Hart who elaborates the minimum content of law which
is demanded by "the setting of natural facts and aims."" The natural
facts or "simple truisms" about man he enumerates and discusses
as: human vulnerability; approximate equality; limited altruism;
limited resources; and limited understanding and strength of will.60
The only aim upon which men agree, according to Hart, is the minimum aim of survival. These "natural facts and aims" give to "the
minimum forms of protection for persons, property, and promises
which are

. . .

indispensible features of municipal law," the status of

natural necessities."70 Thus, there is a core of good sense in the
doctrine of Natural Law" which obviously refutes "the positivist thesis
that 'law may have any content."71 Hart, however, evidently feels
himself able to avoid any implication this might have for his separation of law and morals by a rather extraordinary hypothesis. Hart
states:
[I]t is a truth of some importance that for the adequate description not
only of law but of many other social institutions, a place must be reserved,
besides definitions and ordinary statements of fact, for a third category of
68. HART, op. cit. supra note 54, at 195.
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statements: those the truth of which is contingent on human beings and2
the world they live in retaining the salient characteristics which they have.7

Hart has earlier spelled out what he means when he discusses the
natural facts about man. On "human vulnerability," he writes (and it
is worth quoting in full to savor the exotic flavor):
Yet though this is a truism it is not a necessary truth; for things might
have been, and might one day be, otherwise. There are species of animals
whose physical structure... renders them virtually immune from attack by
other members of their species ....
If men were to lose their vulnerability
to each other there would vanish one obvious reason for the most character3
istic provision of law and morals: Thou shalt not kill.7

In a similar vein on "limited resources" he writes:
Again, in this respect, things might have been otherwise than they are.
The human organism might have been constructed like plants, capable of
extracting food from air, or what it needs might have grown without cultivation in limitless abundance. 74

Certainly, it might be said that Fuller's position, based on man's
nature, does not take these possibilities into account. However, to
quote Fuller in a slightly different context, "[t]here are some out-

comes in human
relations too absurd to rise to the level of conscious
75
exclusion."
The third issue between Hart and Fuller concerns the "inner morality of the law." Here again, as in the first case, the difference is
reducible to different conceptions of law. For Fuller, the inner
morality of law is certainly procedural, but it is also natural law.
With Fuller's view of law as a purposive enterprise, even a procedural
aspect could not be devoid of substantive moral content, and indeed
he demonstrates persuasively and at length the connections between
the internal and external moralities of the law. In his view,
the internal morality of law does indeed deserve to be called a 'morality ..
[A]n acceptance of this morality is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the realization of justice . . . this morality is itself violated when
an attempt is made to express blind hatreds through legal rules .... 76

For Hart, from his positivist position, it is not only possible but
necessary to see the inner morality of law as purely a procedural

concept and thus capable of being subordinated to any end, not
72.
73.
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necessarily a moral one. It may be noted, however, that because
Fuller's Morality of Law was not published until 1964, Hart does not
have to answer his full treatment of the internal morality of law.
It should be apparent that the fundamental divergence between
Hart's and Fuller's positions lies in their underlying concepts of the
nature of "law" and the nature of "morality." These ideas will now
be considered separately.
The whole purpose of Hart's endeavor is to maintain the validity
of the concept of law as a morally neutral entity, formally defined
in terms of its source, which is itself an entity located according to
a set of generally accepted secondary rules from which it derives its
power and authority. Thus, a legal rule once made remains a legal
rule until it is repealed, even if it is not enforced and no longer finds
acceptance. 77 Also, a law will still be a law even if it is "morally outrageous." 78 Hart upholds this "wider" concept of law, defined as "all
rules which are valid by the formal tests of a system of primary and
secondary rules," 79 as of more practical and moral value than the
"narrower" concept that would exclude "morally outrageous" laws as,
by definition, non-laws. The wider concept of law "allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorality." 8 However, if
the question is that of moral usefulness, one might suggest that the
formal validity of law is not much of an obstacle to immoral action.
The real question jurisprudence is concerned with is the possible
immorality of "law," and formal validity is a minor issue. The test
of legality, or legal morality, in Fuller's "procedural" sense is, however, another matter.
We have already noticed something of Fuller's concept of law. Law
is not "a datum projecting itself into human experience,"8 ' but an
achievement of human experience. Law is order in human social life
and "the notion of order itself contains . . . a moral element. 82
The basis of human morality, for Fuller, lies in human purpose; thus
'law as something deserving loyalty must represent a human achievement." Law and obligation are of the same substance and hence
the idea of law cannot be separated from the idea of substantive moral
content. Fuller is, however, far from asserting the identity of law and
morality, a danger which Hart rightly fears. Legal order is a prerequisite for good order, but it is not the same thing. Once the
77. HARr, op. cit. supra note 54, at 170.
78. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAV. L. REy. 593,
600 (1958).
79. HART, op. cit. supra note 54, at 205.
80. Id. at 207.
81. Fuller, supra note 52, at 646.
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question of "law" is decided, there is always the further question of
good or bad law. Fuller's main point is, however, that
a recognition that the internal morality of law may support and give efficacy
to a wide variety of substantive aims should not mislead us into believing
that any substantive aim may be adopted without compromise of legality [or
legal morality].

(This is the manner in which the internal and external moralities of
the law interact.)

Hart deals mostly in terms of "conventional" morality, "the fundamental moral outlook of a given person or society."84 He treats
morality or moral rules in the same formal way that he treats law.
His "broader view" of morality "include[s] in it all social rules and
standards which, in the actual practice of a society, exhibit the four
features . . . .,85 These four formal features, neutral as to content,
are: importance; immunity from deliberate change; voluntary character of moral offenses; and forms of moral pressure. There is great
diversity among moral codes, which vary according to the character
and needs of a given society and such factors as ignorance and
superstition. These different social moralities may, of course, include
principles which are repugnant to our particular viewpoint, however,
going back to the "simple truisms" about man, "the social morality of
societies ... always includes certain obligations and duties, requiring
the sacrifice of private inclination or interest which is essential to
the survival of any society, so long as men and the world in which
they live retain some of their most familiar and obvious characteristics." 86 Apparently, not only morality but man himself is relative.
Perhaps the best way to convey Fuller's concept of morality is to
quote the following passage:
A purpose is, as it were, a segment of a man. The whole man, taken in

the round, is an enormously complicated set of interrelated and interacting
purposes. This system of purposes constitutes his nature, and it is to this
nature that natural law looks in seeking a standard for passing ethical judg-

ments. That is good which advances man's nature; that is bad which keeps
him from realizing it. Just as the dichotomy of is and ought does not apply
to the act of reaching toward the realization of a simple purpose, so it is
equally inapplicable to a whole purposive system. From the reaching that
87
is embedded in that system, we can learn in what directions it should reach.

In The Morality of Law, Fuller develops his "morality of aspira83.
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tion" and places himself in the classical tradition.
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy.

It is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization
of human powers. .

.

. [I]nstead of ideas of right and wrong, of moral

claim and moral duty, we have rather the conception of proper and fitting

conduct, conduct such as be seems human being functioning at his best.8

Sin, for Fuller, is "a failure in the effort to achieve a realization of the
human quality itself."8 9
Fuller rejects absolutes as finally unknowable but does not agree
that a system such as his depends on such knowledge.
I can . . . know the bad on the basis of very imperfect notions of what

would be good to perfection....

We know enough to create the conditions that will permit a man to lift
himself upward. It is certainly better to do this than to try to pin him to
the wall with a final articulation of his highest good. 90

In conclusion, it is my belief that Fuller has made good his case
against legal positivism and has established the basic usefulness and
unavoidability of some concept of the natural law. This is all he does
and it is all he really sets out to do. From the base which he has
provided, and perhaps only from a base such as this, the argument
can now profitably be shifted to the nature and content of the natural
law. Fuller's position on man and morality is no more than is necessary
to tie his whole system together in a rational and comprehensible
manner. While there is no time to assay Fuller's compatibility with
the classical or Christian traditions of natural law, the very basic
nature of his system and the modest claims he makes for it would
suggest that such further investigation might prove profitable. Fuller's
system is based on man, but not in an exclusive or ultimate sense.
Thus, it might prove a useful framework for those who are more
confident about the nature of ultimate reality than is Fuller.
88. FuiERxz, op. cit. supra note 60, at 5.
89. Id. at 3 n.1.
90. Id. at 12.

